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Introduction 
 
Stock market indices are vital to macroeconomists, to financial economists as well as to actors 
in the financial world. Indices consistently built on the long term are essential to assess those 
regularities that help understanding the actual behaviour of financial actors, the evolution of 
the economy, and its position in international comparisons. But financial indices are still more 
useful for traders or investors seeking for summary, accurate, easily and rapidly available 
information on stock markets. History shows that a great variety of indices has been created in 
order to measure the performance of stock markets. This variety grew especially rapidly in the 
recent years. Nevertheless, little discussion of the methodology of indices is conduced today 
in economics or business classes and handbooks, and data series are used for purposes 
sometimes quite different from the ones they were constructed for, sometimes with little 
caution and potentially misleading conclusions. For example, the recent revival in the study of 
long term financial market development, long term returns of investments and international 
comparison between the performances of historical markets seems to us to have been based 
on sometimes quite shaky bases (e.g. Goetzmann Jorion 1999, Rajan Zingales 2001). 
After their invention by successful journalists at the end of the 19th century, stock market 
indices became the focus of the interest of very different groups of people, and their 
construction became a more complex and specialized task. Those studying the indices had 
different objectives and interests. A surprising fact both within the late-19th century context of 
well developed financial markets and from today’s perspective is that the scientific study of 
indices did not result initially from the stock market’s importance in finance (for firms 
financing, for savers’ portfolio choices or for investment banks’ decisions). Most of the initial 
interest came from economists that looked at the stock market only as a measure or an index 
of the macroeconomic situation.  In the US, the “N.B.E.R.” came before the “Cowles 
                                                 
a This paper is part of a project which benefited from grants from the Fonds National de la Science. I thank A. 
Cot, A. Desrosières, G. Faccarello and E. White for helpful suggestions. 
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commission”. In France, the delay was even longer, at least as concerns any practical use of 
these indices.  
This article describes the origins of stock-market indices in the interwar period, with an 
emphasis on France and the United States. It links this evolution with contemporary economic 
theories, index number theory, financial practices, and the other motivations of their authors. 
It examines the consequences of the methodological choices that were made and suggests that 
they had a surprisingly large impact on the results. In particular, we analyse in detail the 
motivations and technical characteristics of the most important indices that were produced 
during the interwar period by the French government statistical office (the Statistique générale 
de la France or SGF). We suggest that these indices cannot be easily compared to most 
usually discussed indices for other countries and that new calculations are required before 
international comparisons.  
Section 1 presents the indices that were built by the financial press and private financial 
organisations for the use of financial markets’ operators. Section 2 shows how emerging 
macroeconomics reinvented indices in a mostly independent way. Section 3 examines in more 
details the construction of both types of indices and their relationship with changes in 
economic thought and the economic context. It shows that the risks involved in using them 
indifferently for any purpose was clearly understood in the interwar period, maybe more than 
today. The most important indices used are displayed in the appendix. 
 
 
I. Early origins and first development : the financial press 
 
US origins and primacy 
The first stock-market indices were constructed and published by financial newspapers as 
day-to-day summaries of the stocks price fluctuations. We may imagine that providing easy to 
calculate, to understand and to remember, reliable and sufficiently detailed indices adequate 
to the investment strategies of the readers became progressively a competitive instrument 
among financial newspapers or financial information providers more generally. However, it 
took a long time. The two first (to our knowledge) such indices were published almost 
simultaneously in 1884 in Banker’s magazine (UK) and by Dow Jones and Co’s Customer’s 
Afternoon letter (the precursor of the Wall Street Journal). The American one was the first 
pure stock-prices index since the British one included the prices of several bonds and, under 
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the name “Dow Jones”, it became the world’s most famous index for decades (Stillman, 
1986)1.  
It was only much later that other journals followed and provided new indices, either because 
the demand remained limited or because the press was not very responsive to that demand2. 
The increase was dramatic in the 1920s, a booming period both for the stock markets and the 
financial press. For example, the New-York Herald Tribune mentioned indices not only in its 
heavy Sunday edition, but even in its daily editions, with a table giving an index of 70 
industrial stocks, one of 30 railroads and one of 30 bonds, with sub-indices by industries3. For 
each index, values for the previous week (max, min), the last day and one year ago were 
given, and, in another table, maximum, minimum and last values for each of the last five 
years. Some editions (Sundays and Mondays in 1929) published graphs of these data, and 
confronted to other economic indicators, such as production indices, price indices, stock 
market volumes of transactions, broker’s loans, interest rates or monetary aggregates. Such a 
quantity of information is quite remarkable, especially for a journal which did not specialize 
in financial information (it published 5 pages of stock exchange quotations, including bonds 
and the “curb” market, but almost no analysis).  
More specialized publications, such as The Annalist, the weekly financial supplement to the 
New-York Times, were even richer, with early regular publication of indices both in tables 
and graphs. In 1925, it already published detailed graphs giving weekly values (min and max) 
for the last few years for a “25 industrials” index and a “25 railroads” other, and tables with 
daily values and yearly max and min since 1913 for the same indices, as well as bonds and 
return indices (for 40 and 10 bonds respectively). In 1929, this information had been 
promoted from page 19 to page 2ss, which gave a weighted index for « eight leading 
industrial stocks »4, graphs comparing stock indices with interest rates, stock transactions, etc. 
On the other hand, no index is given either for other US markets or for foreign ones, although 
some prices are given (mainly for other US markets).  
Some firms pioneered the gathering on a large scale of financial and other statistics, mostly in 
the U.S. where this activity was consistent with the Chandlerian impetus toward the control of 
3
                                                 
1 The almost mythic character of the Dow Jones is revealed by the exhibits which focuses on its history in 
Manhattan in 2005 : http://www.financialhistory.org/EXHIBITS/survival_fittest/ 
2 The following affirmations are based on a necessarily limited sample of journals, but one we consider 
representative. 
3  At the end of 1929, the “industrials” index had the following sub-indices: Mfg (manufacturing) : 15, Oil : 10, 
Utility : 8, steel : 6, C’prs (consumption products ?) : 7, Eqpmt (Equipment) : 4, M stors : 10, Food : 5. Railroads 
were subdivided in great networks and others; bonds in railroads (great networks), other railroads, « utilities » 
and « industrials ».   
4 The index is calculated as 36,6 + Sum of weighted prices. Weights are published and the methodology given in 
detail in the January 6, 1928 issue. Stocks included on July 5th, 1929 were : US Steel, GM, Am. Can, Chrysler, 
GE, Anaconda, Radio, Mont. Ward.  
 
large markets and complex production processes5. The most famous example was the 
Babson’s Statistical Organization, the producer of the Babson barometer of economic activity, 
which was already sufficiently renowned in 1913. The barometer incorporated an original 
stock market index, which played an important role since it was one of the three indices (on a 
total of 25) that benefited from a double weight. 
A much later case is the Standard Company, which produced detailed financial information, 
in particular what became the Standard & Poor’s index. More precisely, the Company 
produced, on a 1926 basis, both small and large sample indices. Like newspapers previously, 
it targeted finance professionals needs by providing them three daily indices (one for 50 
industrials, one for 20 railroads and one for 20 utilities shares). It also published weekly 
industry indices and a broad 392 shares index (324 industrials, 35 utilities and 33 railroads).  
 
English hesitations 
In England, the Financial News (the predecessor of the Financial Times) was at the same time 
presented in a much more traditional fashion, without any quantified data or graph. 
Comments on the stock exchange mentioned neither indices nor any aggregate data, even 
though the journal published many quotations of the London Stock Exchange and built its 
own index, a daily average of 30 industrial ordinary stocks (1918=100). The journal also gave 
a lot of attention to foreign markets (mostly New-York, Paris and Berlin, but also Vienna, 
Amsterdam, Milan, Montreal), publishing substantial samples of security prices (60 for Paris 
for example), but mentioning no index. 
The situation was quite similar in specialized business weekly journals. The international 
reference, the old Economist, started quite late, publishing “by courtesy of the Standard 
Statistics Company, Inc, of NY” its “index figures of American securities values and yields, 
1926=100”, both restricted and broad samples6. Prices of important stocks and transactions 
amounts were also published (the second one from 1930 only). But data for the London 
market appear even later, from February 1st, 1930 for the “Financial News daily average of 30 
industrial ordinary stocks (1918=100)” (with data for the previous week and maximum and 
minimum since the start of the year). From March, 1930 on, the “Monthly supplement” 
provides among other domestic statistics the “security values” (the Banker’s magazine index 
                                                 
5 For a French more specific example, see Flandreau, 2003).  
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6 It published the daily indices values over the last week, and the broad ones in tables giving only maximum and 
minimum yearly values on the last three years. 
 
of 365 securities, December 1921=100), and a table comparing indices in various European 
countries and the United States7. 
 
France 
In France, interest for indices appeared very little. The first two attempts by financial 
periodicals at producing indices quickly aborted : the weekly Reforme Economique published 
in 1901 an index of 81 stocks in 7 groups8, but discontinued it as soon as 1902 ; another index 
was published from November 1912 in the Situation économique et financière by P. Dromel9, 
but the publication stopped in July 1914. We found no use of these indices in other 
publications, which is not surprising since most financial commentators limited their articles 
to discussion of the variations of the price of government debt (the rentes) and some 
important stocks.  
Even in the 1930s, general information daily newspapers didn’t publish indices. Le Temps, the 
bourgeoisie’s daily, did not even mention indices either for Paris or any other market. During 
the 1930s, its “financial day” section sometimes mentioned New-York indices10. The financial 
press was usually not much more modern : it published neither indices nor any comments 
based on them. Comments based on a small number of important securities (mostly bonds) 
contrasted with the rapid increase in the number of listed stocks11. One important exception 
was the Agence économique et financière (AGEFI), a daily newspaper published from 1911 
under the direction of Y. Guyot by a financial information firm of the same name. It published 
regularly the Dow Jones index in the 1930s, and some other foreign indices on a less regular 
basis (taking them, apparently, from German newspapers). Most importantly, it created in the 
early 1930s its own indices (a general one and indices by industry for the two main Parisian 
markets, the parquet and the coulisse12). Many other economic and financial data were 
                                                 
7  Stocks and bonds indices of Banker’s magazine, an official index for 49 industrials from the Netherlands, a 32 
industrial stocks index from National Bank of Switzerland, an official index of 79 industrial stocks from Canada, 
the official Swedish index, the Standard & Poors, all in monthly values. 
8 Banks : 7 shares; railways : 6; coal mines : 30; other mines and metallurgy : 16; transportation : 10; insurance : 
5; other: 7.  
9 It consisted in 5 monthly calculated indices for 1/ government bonds, 2/ bank stocks, 3/ railroads and 
transportation stocks, 4/ metallurgy stocks, 5/ mining stocks. 
10 « These were the indices : industrials : xxx ; railroads : yyy ; other stocks : zzz » (see e.g. July, 2, 1937, p.7). 
Such a rapid and un-precise mention suggests some familiarity with the indices on the part of the readers.  
11 For example, Le Capital, dernières nouvelles économiques et financières (published since 1913) mentioned 
sometimes « the » New-York index (« the index for industrials is xxx ») in the late 1920s… but not even in a 
page-long editorial on the New-York market on October 19, 1929 !  
5
12 More precisely, indices were calculated for : 1. « marché officiel ; terme et criée » (with sub-indices for : 
« rentes françaises » ; « banques » ; « transports, canaux, navigation » ; « eaux, gaz, électricité » ; métallurgie ; 
charbonnages ; mines métalliques ; « pétrole, engrais, produits chimiques » ; valeurs étrangères) ; 2. « marché en 
banque (terme) » (with sub-indices for « sud africaines » ; « charbonnières » ; « mines métalliques »; 
« caoutchoutières » ; « pétrolières » ; « industrielles et diverses ») ; 3. « indices généraux » : marché officiel ; 
marché en banque ; ensemble. 
 
progressively added, some under graphic form, which made the journal the quasi-equivalent 
to US journals.  
Most other periodicals remained sceptical. L’économiste français, the business reference 
weekly, inspired by The Economist, published in its financial section detailed information on 
monetary policy, exchange rates, and financial information, but when presenting stock-
exchanges (either Paris or, more briefly, London, New-York, Canada, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Brussels) kept mentioning commented lists of quotations without any use of 
indices, synthetical tables or graphs, as late as 1938. More detailed comments on stock 
exchange fluctuations (not a frequent exercise) didn’t use indices either. For example, the 
yearly paper published by Edouard Payen on « the quotations of the main securities » 
compared prices in 1913 to the most recent years (e.g. in January 1929, year-end prices for 
1926, 1927 and 1928), but without calculating an index (although the main elements for 
building it were there, most importantly the list of stocks considered as important (in 
whatever sense)13.  
The weekly financial supplement of Le Temps started during the 1930s publishing the AGEFI 
indices. Le messager économique et financier, a purely financial weekly, published a lot of 
qualitative and quantitative informations on listed stocks (balance sheets, coupons payments, 
general meetings) and some financial market general analysis, as well as many prices for 
Paris, foreign or provincial stock exchanges. It was interested in quantitative analysis, since it 
published regularly tables comparing prices during several years for all listed securities. But it 
never mentioned indices. The same was true for L’économiste et le rentier, a bi-monthly 
publication started before World War One which provided generous investment suggestions. 
 
Why such international differences ? 
 
How can one explain such an hostility of most French financial observers towards an 
instrument which was increasingly used in other countries and that themselves used for 
discussing foreign events14 ? This question is related to the general reluctance of the French 
press15, part of the academia16 towards the use of statistics in order to observe and understand 
the economic and social reality. However, we consider that finance, as a relatively 
6
                                                 
13  For example, in the early 1929 paper, stocks selected were distributed as follows : 10 railroads, 4 foreign 
railroads, 16 banks, 12 transportation, 6 electricity, 5 mining and iron and steel, 4 coal mining.  
14 Paradoxically, a systematic look at all articles on the stock market in Le Rentier and L’Economiste Français 
from 1929 to 1932 shows that comments on the New-York crash, based on The Economist, used indices (e.g. 
Viallate, 1929), when no article used the SGF indices to discuss the French situation at the same moment. 
15 As an example, during the 1920s, L’Economiste Français almost never mentioned the price or production 
indices that were regularly published, except for a few articles, when any legal or regulatory change concerning 
securities or the stock market was examined in detail. 
16 Other parts of the academia pioneered the use of statistics: see for example Durkheim on suicide, etc.  
 
independent field, mostly dominated by business needs and behaviours, could have had its 
own evolution and is worth a specific explanation.  
So let’s ask again the question: why didn’t the French financial press use up-to-date 
observation techniques such as stock market indices? 
It is difficult to argue that the reason should be found in the underdevelopment of the financial 
market. The Paris market was one of the most important of the world in the late 19th century. 
As the London market, it was arguably more directed toward government bonds than the 
New-York market (partly because the U.S. government debt was small, partly because few 
foreign governments issued their debts in the more onerous New-York market before the 
war). The Parisian stock market was smaller than the London one in 1914, but stock issues 
increased markedly in the 1920s, as well as the number of stocks listed and their liquidity (see 
Hautcoeur, 1994, 1999). 
The number of stock holders may be more of an explanation: they were still few before the 
war, but their number increased in the U.S. with the trust movement and the invention of 
priority stocks (Baskin, ). It may have increased less in Europe where firms were usually 
smaller. In France, the State had transformed the big railways stocks (everywhere the basis of 
any stock portfolio) into quasi-bonds by giving a dividend guarantee, which may have 
increased the investor’s reluctance toward risk. Nevertheless, the number of stock holders 
probably increased rapidly during the 1920s (Hautcoeur 1994). This development should have 
increased the demand for financial information and indices. 
Behaviours changed: before the war, in France as in many countries, most notorious financial 
advisers, such as Le Rentier’s Neymarck (1913), suggested most categories of savers to 
abstain from buying stocks, except for a small proportion of important portfolios17. After the 
war, these commentators remained biased toward fixed income securities, but they started 
encouraging stock holding. This developed rapidly in France since stocks were supposed (and 
observed) to protect against inflation, which accelerated up to 1926. Reference portfolios 
published by financial periodicals increasingly gave an important and sometimes dominant 
place to stocks18. Diversification was recommended, even if no precise evaluation of what it 
meant was given, and it was widely practiced. 
The organisation of financial systems probably played a role too. First, the techniques for 
stocks issues were different in the U.S., where few banks had the large networks able to sell 
7
                                                 
17 Even for rich investors, the maximum 30% proportion of shares they recommended was far away from the 80-
90% that similar advisers suggest today. 
18 See for example, Le messager économique et financier, 7/1/1920 : the « Tableau d’un ensemble de valeurs à 
revenu fixe et à revenu variable susceptibles de plus values et représentant une fortune totale d’environ 300.000 
francs » suggests (almost in the front page) holding only 73.000 francs (24.3%) in bonds (among which only 
45.000 in public bonds). On July, 10, 1929 (around the market peak), for a 170.000 francs portfolio, it suggested 
only 19.300 francs in bonds, less than 12% of the total.  
 
stocks all over the country, contrarily to the French case. This may explain why French 
investors, if they trusted their bankers, asked for less outside, public, information, whereas 
U.S. (or even English) investors, being less confident in the small intermediaries selling 
stocks, required more independent information (Merril Lynch pioneered large scale brokering 
only after World war two, see Perkins, 1999).  
Maybe more importantly, the rapid development of investment trusts in the U.S. during the 
1920s (Carrosso, 1970 ; White, 1990) was probably a good reason for the increase in the 
demand for financial information and especially of stock indices, since they helped evaluating 
the performances of fund managers. In 1929, an article in Revue d’économie politique 
(Lazard, 1929) described their development in Britain and the U.S.19 and asked for the 
suppression of the tax regulation that almost prohibited their creation in France (since 
dividends paid the income tax twice). 
A third explanation for the absence of indices could be the low level of transactions on the 
Paris stock market in comparison with the New-York market. Low transactions could result 
from “buy and hold” strategies, which themselves may have resulted from high transaction 
costs (which increased substantially during the early 1920s, either through brokerage 
commissions of through taxes on transactions). Such strategies would make unnecessary to 
follow the short term performance of the market. This argument should be substantiated, since 
transactions volume are still little known for the Paris market20. 
A last explanation could be found in the techniques used for stock market analysis in various 
countries. Technical analysis (chartisme in France), a method which never gained academic 
acceptance, was developed early and widely accepted in the U.S. The “Dow theory of 
investment”, attributed to Charles Dow, the founder of the Wall Street Journal and of the 
Dow Jones index, explicitly used the two indices (“transportation” and “industrial”) it 
calculated from 1897. The theory affirmed that the future movements in the market could be 
predicted through the detailed examination of the past levels (and movements) of the indices. 
It gave way to the development of an industry of “scientific” portfolio advising which was 
used even by sophisticated investors. For example, when Comer (1929) presented the 
Standard Company stock indices, he suggested adapting the Dow theory to the major fact of 
the 1920s financial market: the massive development of utilities. Significantly, these 
techniques never reached, as far as we know, the old continent, where, by contrast, financial 
8
                                                 
19 Lazard evaluated the number of trusts in Britain to 55 in 1890 and 150 in 1929, with managed funds of 30 
billion francs, and in the U.S. the number to 18 in 1924 and  200 in 1929 with managed funds of 37 billion 
francs. Carosso gives a number of 750 trusts in the U.S. in 1929.   
20 L’Agence économique et financière published transactions for a small number of securities from 1932.  
 
newspapers abounded in “tips”, proposed by “well introduced” persons, and probably similar 
to those nowadays diffused by spaming21. 
 
There are then a lot of reasons in financial practices to explain the lack of publication of 
financial indices in 1920s France. But if one thinks that information is an important 
determinant of expectations and speculative behavior, the reason why French financiers did 
not ask for indices more adequate to their needs will require further studies in order to be 
better understood. The paradox is then that French statisticians are among the pioneers of the 
production of the most scientific of such indices, those produced by the governmental 
statistical office, the Statistique Générale de la France (SGF), indices which were not directed 
toward financial investors and never became a standard instrument in financial periodicals22.  
 
II. Academic indices : from macroeconomics back to finance 
 
The other origin of stock market indices 
Paradoxically, both the actual origin of stock market indices in France, and the rise of a more 
scientific attitude in the construction and use of such indices in countries where they were in 
more general use, must be traced to the emergence of macroeconomics more than to the 
development of financial markets and practices.  
As it is well known (Desrosière), economic crises were certainly among the main reasons for 
the development both of government statistical offices and academic interest in price, wage 
and later production indices, at the end of the 19th century. For example, the 1907 crisis led in 
France to the creation of a parliamentary commission which strongly recommended a 
development of the production of economic statistics. Both in the U.S. (the Bureau of Labor 
statistics), in France (the Statistique générale de la France began working for the Office du 
travail, and produced price indices from 1911), and in other countries, official price indices 
were constructed in order to measure the impact of crises on the standard of living and more 
generally to fight economic crises. The political importance of these statistics, in contrast to 
previous private (newspapers) indices published for example in England by The Economist 
                                                 
21 Is the early diffusion of significant scepticism toward science an explanation of such a transatlantic 
divergence? The fact is well known that the U.S., rapidly growing thanks to science and technology, kept the 
positivist faith longer than war-affected Europe (see the evolution of Bergson, Nobel prize in 1927). Even before 
the war, Bachelier had introduced some uncertainty in his analysis of the behaviour of stock market prices. A 
comparison between the comments by A. Neymarck and R.W. Babson in the 1913 issue of Journal de la société 
de statistique de Paris clearly suggests that the “science de la Bourse” is more considered a science by the 
American than by the French.  
9
22 A few publications were directed to the general public by former SGF statisticians (L. March published 
Indices du mouvement général des affaires from 1923, and Dessirier followed a few years later with his 
Conjoncture économique et financière), but none became a standard reading for financiers or investors. 
 
(Newmarch price index since 1864) or The Statist (Sauerbeck index since 1885) provided the 
reasons for a more systematic research on the theory of statistical indices.  
Government intervention, economic theory, public sensitivity to business and price 
fluctuations, and the development of statistics reinforced each other (Desrosières, 1993). 
Theories of business cycles and economic fluctuations (among which the quantity theory of 
money, which revived during that period) required a detailed assessment of the chronological 
relationships between the fluctuations of different variables (since antecedence was frequently 
considered as equivalent to causality). Financial variables, which were not included in these 
early statistics (except for public finances), were added when the academic study of business 
cycles emphasized, both theoretically and empirically, the role of financial speculation among 
the precursors or the determinants of fluctuations.  
Academic economists were mainly responsible for the development of these early 
macroeconomics, and official institutions developed most of the first global statistics which 
later led to national accounts. Nevertheless, some of the private firms that started publishing 
indices for stock market operators also ambitioned to play a larger role in economic 
information and even in their macro-economic interpretation. Babson’s Statistical 
Organization was so developed as early as 1913 for the head of the SGF, Lucien March, to 
visit its Boston headquarters in 1913, and later to support before the Société de statistique de 
Paris Babson’s project of an international association of statistical institutes. Babson’s firm 
sold economic and financial information to private firms. It had 60 employees and 100 
correspondents all over the United States. Babson pretended to more than selling already 
existing information: he aimed at understanding and predicting business cycles, the purpose 
of his barometer, inspired by Newton’s physics23. Nevertheless, likely because of the limits of 
the information gathering available to a private firm, Babson’s pretensions were rejected by 
official statistical institutions despite the support of President W. Wilson and a wide public 
success24.  
Among the academic pioneers of the study of business cycles, some became involved in the 
construction of stock-market indices. In the U.S., precursors of such an approach were J. 
Commons and N. Stone (1900), W. Mitchell (1910, 1916) and W. Persons (1916, 1919). 
Magee (1913) introduced stock prices among the prices which relationships with the stock of 
money he examined. In France, where business cycles were studied since the early days of 
10
                                                 
23 Although the name barometer does not make reference to mechanics, it was the proper (and asserted) reference 
of Babson. The prediction methodology consisted in examining the position of the synthetic index (the 
barometer) relative to its long term average, under the assumption that « the general index forms successive 
ondes of constant surfaces around the basic axis » (March, 1913, p. 84). 
24 Although he never gained academic credentials, Babson was widely followed, or at least this is what popular 
Wall Street stories tell even today. See for example: http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/forum/lofiversion/ 
index.php/t3966.html.  
 
Clément Juglar, a similar orientation was pursued by Ch. Rist (1913) or Ch. Mourre (1913), 
for the period starting in 1871. Rist produced new indices of stock prices, and, like Mourre, 
gave them an important role in the prevision of crises. An index restricted to “9 iron and steel 
stocks” was the first published regularly by the SGF, from April, 1914, and during 10 years. It 
benefited from a place in the first page of the Bulletin (although not from a graphical 
representation). It may have followed the Rist (1913) iron and steel index. 
World War One, its managed economy, and the 1920’s economic fluctuations reinforced the 
need for statistics and business cycle theory. New institutions emerged such as the NBER. 
The SGF, still a small institution in comparison with many of its foreign equivalents, was 
reinforced (Sauvy, 1984). International institutions such as the International Labour 
Organization co-ordinated these developments. 
All this led to a more systematic and comparative research on business cycles. The first issue 
of the Review of Economic Statistics in January 1919 was entirely dedicated to “indices of 
economic condition” (among which some stock-market indices) under the direction of W. 
Persons. It later published the famous “Harvard barometer”. Frickey (1919) in the US, 
Persons, Silberling and Berridge (1922) and Bowley (1922) in the UK, M. Lenoir (1919, 
1920) and M. Bourbeau (1921a) in France, constructed stock indices in the same 
macroeconomic perspective25.  
French scholars participated the international movement of business cycles measure and 
theory. Nevertheless, one French peculiarity was the division between ingénieurs économistes 
(educated in the “grandes écoles” responsible for the education of State engineers and more 
generally high level civil servants, such as Polytechnique, Ponts et Chaussées, Mines) and 
academic economists, which were quite hostile to the entry of statistics and mathematics in 
their field26 (Zylberberg, 1990). Efforts to bridge the gap led to the creation of the Institut de 
Statistique de l’Université de Paris by E. Borel, F. Faure and L. March in 1922, but it never 
resulted in scientific publications similar to the Review of Economic Statistics. The 
application of statistics to economics remained de facto the exclusive domain of the 
ingénieurs économistes27, who developed the government statistical offices: SGF and later 
INSEE. For example, the SGF’s head from 1899 to 1920, Lucien March, was a polytechnicien 
and an excellent statistician (Jovanovic & Le Gall, 2002) who participated the business cycles 
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25 All business cycles specialists did not have the same interest in stock market indices. For example, J. Kitchin, 
who had an important role in the development of the London and Cambridge Economic Services, didn’t mention 
them in his famous paper on cycles (Kitchin, 1923). 
26 Among other things, indices were relatively understudied ; for example an academic handbook of statistics 
didn’t discuss them in 1905 and dismissed them as late as 1933 (Liesse, 1905-1933). The same problem limited 
the development of financial theory, which explains partly why Bachelier’s famous 1900 doctoral thesis didn’t 
originate a French tradition in financial theory and was almost forgotten until its rediscovery by Savage, 
Samuelson and Markovitz (Bernstein, 1992) 
27 See L. March (1921, 1930), F. Divisia (1926) or R. Roy (1935). 
 
debate (March, 1913a). This gap in education and the political context led to a separation 
between the development of statistics and macroeconomics on one side (that of the State’s 
ingénieurs économistes) and finance on the other. With the development of State intervention 
in the economy (from the 1936 nationalization of the railways and the Banque de France up to 
the large nationalization movement of 1945), finance became almost a government 
prerogative, the stock market almost disappeared, and if stock market indices were still 
calculated, it was only by tradition28. 
It is then not surprising to observe that stock market indices were little used in academic 
journals during the 1920s, even if their use elsewhere was recognized. For example, in the 
1929 issue of Revue d’économie politique (the leading academic journal in France then), H. 
Laufenburger made reference to a German index of 329 stocks which “has the same 
predicting role as the one recognized since long to the Harvard speculative curve” 
(Laufenburger, 1929, p.1121), but a similar article on Britain mentioned no stock exchange 
data (Pouyanne, 1929). In the yearly issue on the French economic situation, some of the 
articles on the main industries mentioned neither a firm’s name nor a stock price (e.g. on 
chemicals or automobile in 1930) when others used stock prices, and compared them to 
sectoral stock indices (Adam, 1930). This reflected a growing role of business cycle theory, a 
theory in which stock market indices gained some role during that period.  
 
The place of stock market indices in business cycles theory : the French case.  
 
As suggested above, macroeconomic theory gave during the interwar period a substantial role 
to stock markets fluctuations, something which later disappeared for a long period. This is 
mostly exemplified in the French case by the evolution of articles in Revue d’économie 
politique. In the early 1920s, the only regular article dedicated to the stock exchange was one 
by a young scholar named Marcel Bourbeau. After writing a dissertation on the subject 
(Bourbeau, 1921a), he published from 1921 on stock market indices of his own29, 
accompanied by some mostly descriptive comments. The impact of economic and mostly 
political events on the stock exchange fluctuations was discussed, and most space was 
dedicated to analysis at the industrially or the individual stock levels. The same was true for 
the somewhat more economic-minded article by Jean Lescure (1923).  
                                                 
28 INSEE would even build, a posteriori, an index of nationalized firms (INSEE, 1950).  
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29 Bourbeau’ index includes 238 securities groupes in 8 bonds subgroups and 18 shares subgroups (within which 
26 subsubgroups). The complete list is given as an annex to Bourbeau (1921b). In 1926 and 1927, he adds two 
graphs to the tables, one with the general index and the exchange rate of the pound sterling, the other with 
several indices (French bonds, foreign bonds, shares). 
 
This changed when Jean Dessirier started, in 1928, publishing his analysis of the relationships 
between the stock market fluctuations and the economy. Although he didn’t give up industrial 
or even individual stock analysis, most of his comments were strongly grounded in official 
indices of prices, industrial production, monetary aggregates, Banque de France operations, 
stock exchange operations, interest rates, and aimed at developing a theory of their 
relationships with stock market fluctuations (Dessirier, 1929a, p. 499ss). Dessirier’s method 
was an empirical and mostly graphical one: he compared stock market indices and dividend 
yields (“taux de capitalisation”) to each other and to indices of real activity, both for France in 
the 1920s (1928a, 1928b, 1929a), for France before World War 1 (1928a, 1929c) and for a 
sample of countries (1929b). Comparing the dates of maxima and minima, and the 
correlations in variations, he showed for example that stock market indices are good 
predictors of crises but not of recoveries, something he explained by a theory of expectations 
formation.  
 
Interestingly, stock market indices were used in the debate on business cycles that took place 
in the 1920s in France, like in other countries, between empiricists and theoreticians. On the 
one hand, radical empiricists constructed “black-box” barometers aiming at anticipating crises 
(Babson, 1913; Brookmire, 1913; see Armatte, 1992) : their construction methodology was 
hidden and probably debatable, and the success in prediction was the unique criterium of 
excellence that their authors recognized. They never gain much acceptance in France during 
the interwar period, because of the limited private demand for their results, but they were 
seriously discussed in the U.S. (for example in Harvard). On the other hand, theoreticians 
denied any scientific validity to such a method, and asked for the statistical measure of the 
rigorous concepts they used.  
In France, Dessirier, although his method was quite empirical, refused both the Babson 
barometer (“automatic”, “based on too few elements”, and “with no actual economic sense”, 
1928, p. 154) and the Harvard one (because the three synthetical indices “represent a small 
number of particular elements, associated and calculated in arbitrary fashion”, ibid). To the 
“rigidity” of fix weighting of different economic indices, he preferred a more eclectic method. 
Nevertheless, this did not impede him from calculating and presenting graphically a band 
within which the stock index should fluctuate, band which boundaries were given by 2.75 and 
3.25% dividend yields applied to the stock index, a quite rigid method indeed. At the 
opposite, Ch. Mourre (1913, 1929) gave the priority to the theory, arguing that only monetary 
factors could have a significant impact on economic as well as stock market fluctuations, and 
invoking the tradition of Torrens and Spiethof.  
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All this suggests that debates on the use of stock market indices were very similar in France 
and in the U.S. or the U.K. Before rigorous econometric modelling, inductive approaches 
remained either simplistic or eclectic, and deductive ones remained poor.   
 
This macroeconomic tradition of stock indices continued under the auspices of the NBER in 
the US, as can be seen in the work of Cole and Frickey (1928), and the synthesis by Mitchell 
(1938). In France, a few scholars kept searching for a theory linking macroeconomics and 
financial markets through new statistical methods (e.g. Guillaume (1932), at the crossing of 
the walrasian and SGF traditions). Nevertheless, with the Great Depression and the rise of 
Keynesian macroeconomics, the stock market came to be seen mostly as the locus of 
irrational behaviour and was marginalized in macroeconomic thinking. It came back only 
more than two decades later, when new theories started to give it a new role in investment 
behaviour (e.g. Tobin, 1969), that is, when the macroeconomic tradition came to encounter 
the new-born modern financial theory.  
 
Financial indices 
Academic theoretical as well as empirical finance was a different, mostly independent, and 
surprisingly late origin of the calculation of stock market indices. Before WW1, portfolio 
strategy was already an almost independent set of literature, at least in the business press; but 
it lacked a serious theoretical and quantitative basis. The increasing importance of finance in 
business and in personal saving led to its development as an academic discipline. In the US, 
business schools strived and developed doctoral programs and academic journals in business 
(Wharton : 1921, Harvard : 1922, Harvard Business Review : 1922, Journal of Business of the 
University of Chicago : 1928). Academics and students started examining such questions as 
investor’s behaviour (portfolio optimisation) or manager’s choices (among various financial 
resources). This did not happen in France, where business schools were deeply separated and 
suspicious of the academic community (and reciprocally).  
Fisher (1925) was again a pioneer in trying to evaluate the performance of various 
investments and studying the possibility of forecasting the stock market. Another example is 
Jackson (1928). But the biggest impulse was given by Alfred Cowles who created the Cowles 
Commission in 1931, partly in order to understand his own failure as an investor (Wilson & 
Jones, 1987). An important task of the Cowles Commission was the retrospective calculation 
for the years 1871-1925 of a stock market index consistent with the Standard & Poor 500, 
which had been published since 1926 (Cowles, 1939). That perspective was followed by the 
CRSP at Chicago, which started registering daily prices and market operations of listed US 
firms. 
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Even in the U.S., empirical studies had to wait for the achievement of the CRSP database and 
the development of computers, and theory went ahead in the 1950s without much empirical 
verification (Markovitz, CAPM) (see Berstein) In France, neither theory nor empirical studies 
developed much since the financial market was so much in the hands of the State. 
 
III. Methodological choices in the construction of stock market indices 
 
The construction of statistical indices faces a number of methodological problems which were 
understood only progressively throughout history. Debates were important during the pre-
world war one period, and were mostly closed with a book by Irving Fisher (1922). 
Nevertheless, as Armatte (2003) showed, these debates concerned mostly consumer price 
indices, something which may affect badly the construction of stock market indices. In 
particular, it appeared early that weighting problems were not secondary in that case, because 
of the enormous differences in size between firms that, combined with important differences 
in price fluctuations among shares, could lead to substantial errors30. We will try below to 
analyze the methods used by the most important of the old indices that we mentioned above. 
The major problem we will face when pursuing this analysis is that the precise methods were 
frequently not described, especially when contemporaries chose implicit solutions to 
problems they were not conscious of. We will nevertheless try to understand their choices and 
evaluate the consistency of the methodological choices that were made. Before turning to that, 
we summarize now the choices that one faces when constructing or continuing a stock market 
index. These choices include:  
- The choice of the market which the index summarizes: it can be the entire financial 
market of a national economy or that of a specific institution (U.S. market vs New-
York Stock Exchange).  
- The choice of a frequency of publication (during the interwar period, it could go from 
daily to monthly). 
- The choice of the kind of prices used: either the average of the prices during a period 
(day, week, month) or a particular price (e.g. the closing price of the last Friday in the 
month). 
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30 Weighting problems were discarded as secondary by Edgeworth (1896), but concerning price indices. Still, 
some weighted price indices were constructed (SGF, 1928) 
 
- The choice of the securities included: stocks, bonds, specific securities such as 
privileged stocks, convertible bonds, multiple voting shares31. Legal changes could 
affect indices through these choices. 
- The choice of the number of securities included, and that of the selection method 
(including for changing the list). Differences in liquidity between securities, which 
could be important, made that choice crucial; but liquidity was not always measured 
(or published).  
- The choice of sub-groups among which the securities should be distributed (among 
industry, legal considerations such as nationality, market of listing, kind of security, 
etc).  
- The choice of the weighting method (either constant or variable) and the weighting 
variables (capitalization, liquidity, float).  
- The method for allowing for capital operations affecting firms (mergers, acquisitions, 
dividend payments, share splits, etc.). 
- The way the entry or exit of securities are taken into account in the index, whether 
they are provisory (missing values were very frequent during our period, especially for 
small firms), or definitive.  
- The consistency problem between indices built backward (retrospectively) and 
forward (without any information on the future).  
 
All these choices depend on the purpose of the index and on the practices that dominate the 
financial (and/or the statistical) industry. They also depend on the data available (for example, 
prices on unofficial markets may be difficult to find with a reasonable accuracy), and of the 
cost and time they require (a substantial problem before computers). One may argue that all 
these choices, especially the weighting ones, are very important, especially because the 
diversity of behaviours is especially important among stocks (in comparison with consumer 
prices).  
 
Early indices 
As we presented above, the initial development of indices was done by newspapers as day-to-
day summaries of the market’s evolution. The readers’ satisfaction was key, and the best way 
to convince them was to present the indices as simple portfolios similar to theirs, including 
only the most famous and undisputable stocks, all listed on the same important stock-
16
                                                 
31 For example, in France, « parts de fondateurs » were a category of shares with no voting right and the right to 
a fixed share of profits after the payment of a « normal interest » (usually 5% of face value) to normal shares. 
Other specific securities also existed. 
 
exchange. Until reputation was established, the possibility for the dubious reader to replicate 
the index was important, so the list of included stocks was published and the calculation 
method kept simple32. Another important reason was the daily publication of the journals, a 
few hours after the close of the stock exchange, which required simple calculations.  
Early indices like the Dow Jones are good examples of this: the Dow was calculated as the 
simple arithmetic sum of the prices of a group of stocks listed on the NYSE, without any 
effort to weight or correct them in order to take into account either their market capitalization, 
their liquidity or anything else. The list included famous stocks, but their choice was not 
discussed. The list changed very little, except for the early separation of the “industrials” and 
“railroads” indices. Babson’s index was also based on a limited sample of stocks, all of them 
railroads with the exception of one, the Pullman Company33! The only early index that 
included a greater number of securities was that of the Banker’s magazine, a weekly 
publication, which as we mentioned included both stocks and bonds.  
 
Difficulties probably emerged rapidly in the calculation of these indices, but they were not 
really presented by the newspapers, which purpose was not to educate or impose calculation 
sophistications to their readers. In the medium term, dividends were to count as much as price 
variations, splits and any other capital operation could give the choice to capitalists between 
various options, which affected the value of their portfolios, which should also be rebalanced 
more or less regularly. All these “details” appeared in the comments of the financial journals, 
but without affecting much the indices they published. This was not much of a problem as 
long as investors were mostly interested in the main fluctuations of the indices (as was the 
case for those using the “Dow theory”), not in comparing their portfolio return with an 
independent reference or target. Another challenge was the increase in the number of 
industrial stocks listed on stock-exchanges, which made indices limited to “blue chips” appear 
restricted.  
Actually, new methods were to enter the financial press through two “detours”: one through 
the development of macroeconomic indices and academic debates on indices, the other via the 
emergence of mechanical and electronic calculators after the 1930s, a necessity if the 
calculation of indices was to be frequent and rapid enough in order to be used by financial 
operators and the daily press. 
 
Macroeconomic indices outside France 
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32 The fact that their reputation was already established could explain why some newspapers chose not to publish 
their method, like AGEFI.  
33 The precise list can be found in Mourre (1913, p.204) 
 
The methodological limitations of the early indices led sophisticated statisticians and 
academic economists wanting to test business cycles theories to reconstruct indices for long 
term periods, which led to much methodological progress. 
The macroeconomic perspective led to important choices in the construction of stock market 
indices. First, the sample was not chosen in order to represent a typical investor’s behaviour, 
but to include firms of all important industries in order to be representative of the economy. 
This led some of them to include more stocks, sometimes listed on various stock-exchanges, 
and to calculate sub-indices for various groups (by industry, by firm size, by type of security). 
Furthermore, the purpose was not to include the diversity of behaviours represented among 
listed securities (in what would be an essential tool in a portfolio diversification strategy), but 
to reflect the common variations of the market, in order to link them to those of the economy. 
The sampling methods adopted by the U.S. scholars show this perfectly. Persons chose to 
select strictly the stocks he introduced in his index, eliminating all whose fluctuations 
“diverged” from the “’normal” one (among 19 railroad stocks available to him for the 1898-
1909 period, he eliminated 8 for such reasons). Mitchell (1916) clarified best the 
methodological choices required by the construction of stock indices. In the logic of the 
business cycles research program, he suggested developing large indices, modifying their 
structure every 10 or more years in order to follow the industry-distribution of the market. 
Other authors sometimes did not change that structure. They included all shares for which 
prices were regularly available, without concern for their actual importance on the market34, 
they included little (if any) correction for capital operations and didn’t weight prices either by 
market value or transactions. 
 
French indices:  
Like in other countries, methodologies improved with time in the construction of French 
indices. Actually, this is what one must guess, since early indices’ methodologies were 
usually not published35. As late as 1921, Bourbeau (1921a) could publish in a doctorate 
dissertation an index without explaining how it was constructed36. It was nevertheless a 
private and limited attempt, and cannot be compared with the dominant indices produced by 
the SGF. 
18
                                                 
34 Some indices included very few shares. For example, Fisher’s index, published in Review of Econoic 
Statistics (1921, 1926) included only 20 shares. It was nevertheless well considered by some commentators 
(Dessirier, 1929a, p1466). 
35 This was the case for example for the indices by Rist (1913) or the first SGF pre-war index. 
36  His index was a broad one, including several industry groups. Actually, the methodology was not even 
mentioned by Bourbeau, and we had to reconstruct it by using his data: each industry index as well as the global 
one were the arithmetic means of included individual securities’ indices, without any correction for capital 
operations or any weighting. 
 
The SGF main stock index (indice des valeurs à revenu variable) was the only published 
during the entire interwar period. It was first presented in a paper by M. Lenoir (1919), and 
then published from April, 1922 in the SGF monthly bulletin, which also gave details on the 
methodology and its modifications (SGF, 1926, 1927, 1932a, 1932b). The SGF also published 
yearly companion indices on capitalization rates (dividend yields) and net (of tax) earnings for 
the stocks included in that index. 
The index was calculated and published starting in 1919 on contemporaneous data. It was a 
broad composite index, including 186 stocks in 1919, 194 in 1926, 288 in 1927 and 300 from 
1929 to the war. It covered mostly the official Parisian stock-exchange (the Parquet), with 
occasional prices taken from the unofficial Coulisse or from provincial stock-exchanges37. 
Most but not all the shares were ordinary ones, which made the index quite homogeneous38. 
The index was a monthly one from 1919 to 1929 (end of month prices39) and weekly from 
1930. All these characteristics confirm that the index was undertaken in the macroeconomic 
vision that we described. 
Nevertheless, the index aimed at more than measuring business cycles. When defining the 
index for each share’s price, Lenoir (1919) explicitly mentioned adjustment for new issues. 
SGF (1927) explained how account was taken of the impact of share dividends, reserve 
distributions, late payments (liberation) of existing shares, and how coefficients of adjustment 
were calculated for every operation in a fairly modern manner40. This could be consistent 
either with a portfolio management perspective, or - more reasonably given the size of the 
index - with a macroeconomic cost of capital perspective. 
Industry groups’ indices were constructed from 1919 on as the arithmetic mean of the group’s 
securities prices. There were 25 industry groups in 1919, each one including from 1 to 26 
different shares (median : 5). The general index was the arithmetic mean of the groups’ 
indices.41. Little reasons were given for the group’s construction. Lenoir (1919) actually 
suggests an economic and not a financial perspective on the construction of these groups, 
since he discusses the differences in the chronologies of fluctuations among industries in 
terms of their market power and fixed-price contracts in the face of global price level 
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37 The market was not mentioned in Lenoir (1919), but SGF (1927) mentioned one share listed in Lyon, one in 
Lille, nine in the Coulisse (including 2 foreign firms). SGF (1932b) mentioned six listed in the Coulisse and 
none outside Paris.  
38 SGF (1927) mentioned 14 actions de jouissance (among which 5 from the great railroads) and 2 priority 
shares (respectively 7 and 1 in 1932 : see SGF, 1932b). 
39 Prices were taken from the daily Cours Quotidiens published by the official Compagnie des agents de change. 
40 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether calculations between 1919 and 1927 took into account all these operations 
or only new issues. 
41 Little reasons were given for the group’s construction. Lenoir (1919) actually suggests an economic and not a 
financial perspective, since he discusses the differences in the chronologies of fluctuations among groups in 
terms of their market power and fixed-price contracts in the face of global price level fluctuations. 
 
fluctuations. Most comments in Revue d’économie politique (see above) also used the group 
indices as proxies for the competitiveness or health of the industries covered. 
Some transformations in the methodology of the index are also consistent with an economic 
interpretation, actually one much in line with the particular features of the interwar period’s 
economy. First, the index was modified in order to represent more the French national 
economy: a change in presentation was decided in 1926, a new synthetic index being 
calculated for the 23 groups of “French firms”, excluding the group of foreign railroads and 
that constituted by the Suez Canal alone (SGF, 1926). The reason given for this separation 
was the fact that the inflation differential between France and many other countries in the 
preceding years had created a discrepancy between the evolution of the prices for these two 
groups of firms, and then a bias in the index42. Ironically, the stabilization of the franc 
occurred within a few months after that change, making it almost useless. More profoundly, 
many French firms having most of their activity abroad or in the French empire remained 
within the “French firms” index, so that the 1926 reform was only a partial move toward a 
more geographically-founded index. 
A more profound reform of the index occurred in 1927, allegedly because of the recognition 
that an “artificial weighting” (SGF, 1927: 391; 1932a : 48) resulted from the very 
heterogeneous evolutions of individual shares’ prices (and industry group indices) since the 
pre-war basis 43. The number of shares was augmented to 288, the number of group decreased 
to 20 (respectively 300 and 22 in a small change in 1932), with a more even number of shares 
per group (median: 13). Many aspects of this reform created a strong discontinuity in the 
index. First, around 100 firms were substituted for others and 100 new firms entered the 
index, without the reasons nor the impact being discussed. Second, the general index changed 
from the average of group indices (which were still being calculated44) to the average of 
individual stocks indices, which suggests a move toward an interpretation in terms of 
macroeconomic cost of capital. Third, the creation of a separate index for “foreign firms” and 
separate groups for “colonial firms” and “French firms with activity abroad” achieved the 
“nationalization” of the index, quite consistent with the interwar’s general trend toward a de-
globalisation of the international economy and with the increasing relative importance for the 
20
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, the index was not recalculated retrospectively, so that there exist no index of “French firms” 
before that date. 
43 From then on, re-weighting giving again an equal share to all firms occurred regularly, at least during the 
following years: August 1928, July 1929, September 1930 and January 1932 are known (SGF, 1932b). 
44 Some group indices were recalculated back to 1919, although incompletely: 12 industry groups’ indices, 
whose compositions didn’t change much, were not recalculated. Two entirely new groups were not calculated 
backward. For two groups that resulted from the fusion of various old ones, pre-1926 indices were calculated as 
the average of previous groups’ indices. Only 4 groups had their indices entirely calculated backward to 1919 
with the same methodology as for the post-1926 period (see annex 1). 
 
French economy and the French savers of the colonial Empire. 45 That situation was 
maintained during the following decades (INSEE, 1950, p.156s). 
 
Financial indices 
The birth of modern finance led to a demand for better calculated indices. The best private 
answer came from the Standard Company, which indices obtained more audience than those 
calculated by academic economists. Comer’s 1929 paper actually provides a convincing 
demonstration of the qualitative transformation from earlier indices to those of that Company. 
Not only did the Company publish many diverse indices, but it claimed it worried about the 
details and the methodological preoccupation of academic indices46. All indices were 
weighted by capitalization, which made them much better references for portfolio managers, 
and solved most of the technical problems with capital operations and changes in the list of 
shares included (Comer, 1929, p.11). The quality and representativeness of the small sample 
indices were also tested by comparing them regularly with the broad one. Another test was 
provided by comparing industry indices47 to their value without the biggest firm in the 
sample, in order to distinguish what was really the result of economic, general, evolutions, 
from the specifics of one particular firm48. (Comer, 1929). Lastly, the Standard Company 
published dividend indices (for the 50 shares of the small sample only), which allowed the 
calculation of dividend yields and returns, something new among privately published 
indices49.  
We mentioned that AGEFI started a few years later publishing similar indices in France. 
Unfortunately we were unable to find the methodology it used for its calculations, which at 
least suggests that the efforts to make it open were probably lower50. Paradoxically, it was the 
SGF that tried to provide indices adequate to the need of the financial community. Maybe 
under the influence of Dessirier (who started publishing a periodical, Conjoncture 
économique et financière, dedicated to a larger public), the SGF twice started to construct 
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45 It is not clear whether the new series given in 1927 recalculate backward the general index excluding those 
foreign firms in order to be homogeneous with the post-1927 series. 
46 « We are not among those who have been seeking a mechanical barometer that will « forecast » stock prices, 
but over a period of several years our efforts have been directed to the devising of a set of adequate measures of 
historical price movements » (p. 9) 
47 Industry indices were justified not so much by economic arguments than by portfolio management ones : the 
« group theory » suggested that the behaviours of shares in the same industry should have much in common, so 
that holding one was sufficient for diversification purposes (Comer, 1929).  
48 In the case of the automobile industry, the exclusion of General Motors, which had performed exceptionally 
well in the late 1920s and had a very dominant position, changed entirely the industry index. 
49 The preoccupation with dividends and total return was already present among academics and statistical 
agencies. In the U.S. case, one example was Jackson (1928) who proposed a precise methodology for calculating 
the returns on various categories of stocks. He calculated yearly returns, taking into account dividends and other 
distributions, splits, issues and other capital operations. 
50 Maybe significantly, the index was during the first year of its publication included in pages of the newspaper 
that have not been conserved by the French Bibliothèque nationale. 
 
small sample indices on a more frequent basis and following a methodology that took more 
under consideration the actual functioning of the capital market. These narrow indices were 
based on the idea that the volumes traded and the volatility of the stock market were worth 
observing in contrast with the general index’s motivations. The first one appeared in 1926, 
when the SGF published a retrospective index for ten stocks51 listed on the forward market (la 
cote du terme), arguing that, first, “speculation (…) is a forward market phenomenon”, and 
that “if one takes into account the width and velocity of price fluctuations, one may desire to 
know not only end of month prices but also average values and extreme points, which 
requires following the quotes day after day. This cannot be done for an index of 200 quotes, 
but the new indices, calculated for a limited number of securities, have been calculated, since 
two years, for every stock-market session” (BSGF 1926, p.186). Unfortunately, little detail 
was given on the construction of the index, and its publication was not continued. 
New narrow indices were published by the SGF from October, 1932 for around 25 shares52 
and 10 bonds which transactions volumes it obtained from the Chambre syndicale des agents 
de change (BSGF, July 1932, p.565). 53 All were quite sophisticated: the price index was the 
geometric mean of a Paasche and a Laspeyres indices of prices weighted by transaction 
volumes. The transaction index was symmetric and an index of the value of transactions was 
the product of the two previous ones (SGF, 1934). Most importantly, the index included a 
number of foreign shares (around half the total in 1934). All this suggests this index had a 
clear financial objective, which is confirmed by the comments in the BSGF, concerned with 
explaining the day-to-day volatility of the stock market (e.g. SGF, 1934, p. 447). 
Nevertheless, these indices don’t appear to have been used by actual financial operators. We 
may very well consider they measured financial market activity (“speculation”) as 
macroeconomists want it. Actually, the misunderstanding toward the very concept of portfolio 
management appears for example in the judgement by Dessirier toward Fisher return 
calculations: since they were based on a changing list of « blue chips », he considered that 
they could not provide a continuous time series (Dessirier, 1929a, p. 1467). Not surprisingly, 
SGF was not the place for responding to the statistical needs of business. 
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51 Banque de Paris, Chemin de fer d’Orléans, Compagnie générale d’électricité, Forges et aciéries du Nord et de 
l’Est, Tréfileries du Havre, Mines de Lens, Phosphates de Gafsa, Chargeurs réunis, Voitures à Paris, Raffinerie 
Say). Another index was constructed for 5 “foreign” (firms whose operations are mostly outside France) stocks, 
also listed on the forward market : Canal de Suez, Crédit Foncier Egyptien, Nitrate railways, Rio Tinto, 
Norvégienne de l’Azote. 
52 It rose from 22 initially to 23 in October 1923 to 26 in April 1935, 24 in July 1935, 26 in January 1936, 29 in 
July 1936 and 31 from July 1938 until the war.  
53 Weekly values appeared from October 1932 and June 1933 (respectively for volume and price indices), and 
even obtained the honorific position of appearing in the front page “Mouvement économique général” of the 
BSGF from July, 1933 to January, 1934.  
 
The improvement in indices as seen by contemporaries  
 
Proving the superior quality of the indices one produces was as important yesterday as today, 
i.e. it was very important at least for private producers. What was more important than 
technical improvement, however, was the fact that it was driven by new questions and 
theories. 
Comer (1929) dedicated his long article mostly to demonstrate the superior quality of the 
Standard Cy indices. Beside all technical details we already mentioned, a particularly funny 
and paradoxical argument in favour of these indices was the fact that they gave similar results 
to previous, established, indices (the Dow Jones and the New-York Times indices, in that 
case)54. The fact behind this is that the more sophisticated techniques in finance for which the 
Standard Company’s data and indices would be useful had not yet been invented. 
Another example is the critique proposed by Dessirier, when he discussed his fellow Lenoir 
long term series for the SGF index. Although we didn’t mention it in particular, much of the 
energy dedicated by academics to the construction of stock indices had been used to 
reconstruct long term retrospective indices. This was clearly in line with the business cycles 
measurement objective of these economists. In France, the first attempt at reconstructing a 
retrospective index was Lenoir (1919, 1920). A yearly55 index, it covered the 1856-1918 
period and included 54 stocks as soon as 1876, using the same methodology as the SGF main 
index. The problem with Lenoir’s index (like with most retrospective indices) is that it 
suffered survivor bias, being reconstructed starting from 1919 listed firms. Another, related, 
problem concerned the weighting of firms. Dessirier (1928a) discussed in detail that problem, 
measuring the impact in the long run of different years being chosen as the basis for equal 
firm’s weights. He showed that depending of these choices, the growth rate of the index 
between 1870 and 1913 could vary from less than 50% to more than 500% (and even on the 
shorter 1900-1913 period from 20 to 50%). In the long run, regular re-weighting of portfolio 
was then shown to be a requisite.  
This long term tendency preoccupation suggests that there may have been a more profound 
reason for Dessirier to work again on Lenoir’s data: macroeconomists were then not only 
interested in observing business cycles and establishing their chronologies (something which 
was not much affected by tendency errors). They started being interested in long run growth 
rates, of which long run return on capital and long run growth of the capital stock could be 
                                                 
54 Furthermore, and just logically, discrepancies also appeared, which another commentator could have used in 
order to demonstrate the Standard’s indices superiority ! 
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55 It was calculated on a yearly basis with prices until 1916 were taken from the yearly Annuaire des valeurs 
cotées à la Bourse de Paris, a publication by the Compagnie des agents de change that gave only minimum and 
maximum prices over the course of the year. 
 
important indicators. Once again, the change in theoretical questions was, maybe 
unconsciously, driving the search for better methods and the criticism of older ones. 
 
Then, the discrepancies between the indices produced during that period may reflect in part 
technical defects and insufficient availability of calculation power. But most interestingly, it 
also reflects the changing intellectual orientations of successive generations of financiers and 
academics. Understanding these discrepancies will not only be a source for specific financial 
studies, but should be grounded in the history of financial and economic theory. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We showed in this article that the development of stock market indices followed a 
complicated path: it started with financial newspapers producing simple summaries of the 
market daily evolution; it then switched to macroeconomists interested in measuring and 
understanding long term business cycles or, later, the growth of the capital stock and the 
return on that stock; it finally went back to finance, when a more sophisticated demand 
developed there. Technical improvements in the construction of indices cannot be considered 
outside that intellectual evolution, which led to the synthesis of modern finance-grounded 
macroeconomics. Outside simple “improvements”, differences in purpose and theoretical 
background gave rise to very different indices, both in level and volatility, so that those 
indices that were constructed and used in the past must be placed in the proper historical and 
intellectual context before being used today in different perspectives. 
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Various US stock market indices (1939:12 = 100) 
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Various French stock market indices 
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